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Abstract 
In 2010-11 over $45 billion GST monies, and about $24b of other grants, will be distributed between the 
States and Territories on the recommendation of the Commonwealth Grants Commission. The 
Commission is instructed to implement Horizontal Fiscal Equalisation (HFE); and not to be concerned 
with efficiency. The paper examines how the CGC pursues fiscal equality, and finds some systematic 
flaws. The adjustments made by the CGC for demography and mining, but not for wages, undoubtedly 
reduce inequality in fiscal capacities, from a short-run point of view. However, for payroll tax 
assessments, the CGC can mistakenly transfer moneys from equals to equals; and disturb an efficient 
pattern of interstate migration and settlement. The reason is that labour mobility tends to make working 
households indifferent between jobs in different jurisdictions, with the differences in wage rates 
compensating for locationally-specific differences in costs of living. In addition to equity flaws, I note 
some negative efficiency effects, as counterweights to the common claims that HFE improves economic 
efficiency.  Interestingly, HFE in Australia strives for full equalisation of state budget capacities; in 
contrast, governments attempt only partial equalisation of private budget capacities. I present a 
framework for considering the trade-off between equality and efficiency, adapted from Brennan and 
Pincus (2004 and 2010). The main result is that little or no allowance should be made for interstate 
differences in unit costs of public provision of (public or private) goods and services. An alternative 
distribution of GST monies is estimated for 2010-11. 
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The Commonwealth Grants Commission is charged by the Council of Australian Governments with 
recommending the distribution of the GST monies— forecast at around $45 billion for 2010-11—so as to 
achieve horizontal fiscal equalisation (HFE).  Also thrown into the pot are about $24b of fungible grants 
already committed by the Commonwealth to the various states.  In its latest report, the Commission 
defines fiscal equalisation as: 
'A distribution of GST revenue to State governments such that, after allowing for material factors affecting 
revenues and expenditures, each would have the [same] fiscal capacity to provide services and their associated 
infrastructure at the same standard, if each made the same effort to raise revenue from its own sources, operated 
at the same level of efficiency and maintained the average per capita net financial worth.' (CGC 2010:157) 
How is this done? On the expenses side, the Commission (in effect) calculates the cost for each 
jurisdiction of financing the all-state average per capita of the public provision of a range of goods and 
services. On the revenue side, the Commission calculates what monies would have been raised if the state 
had levied the all-state average rates of taxation or charge for a range of imposts, and applied them 
seriatim to the state‘s corresponding revenue bases. The recommended grants eliminate any gap between 
hypothetical expenses and hypothetical revenues.
1 
The CGC compares its grant recommendations against a standard, which is equal per capita (EPC).
2  
Appendix Table A1 shows the factors with the largest effects on redistribution away from EPC. In this 
paper, on the revenue side I will concentrate on payroll and land taxes, and revenues from mining; on the 
expenditure side, the dominant factors are socio-demographic—and specifically, Indigeneity and the age-
structure—as well as wage costs. 
It is important to recognise that the Commission is charged with the task recommending a distribution of 
grants that would bring about fiscal equalisation
3; and that it has not been asked to consider and does not 
report on the consequences of HFE for economic efficiency.  Nonetheless, the CGC is concerned with 
‗policy neutrality‘; that is, it wishes to reduce or minimize any influence that it may have on the 
incentives of states to be efficient in what they do; or to ‗game‘ the system.
4  Other than in a few instances 
(in particular, mining revenues), the Commission believes that its methods sufficiently satisfy the 
criterion of policy neutrality. 
                                                           
1 This is a simplification—in many instances, when the data are not suitable or the matter not material, the 
Commission attributes equal per capita revenue capacity or spending obligations; in other cases, the Commission 
uses its own judgments to ‘discount’ the factor and its effects on the CGC’s recommendation. 
2 There is no definitive way to attribute GST collections to specific states according to where the GST-liable 
transaction took place. This is because the GST is a Commonwealth tax, and is commonly paid by a company or 
firm’s head office, and not necessarily from the state where the GST-liable transaction—final or intermediate—
took place.  
3 The goal of fiscal equalisation (through the distribution of GST monies) is mandated in the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on Federal Financial Relations 2008; and cannot be changed except unanimously. 
4 ‘Policy neutrality means policy differences between the States do not affect the recommended GST distribution. 
We implement policy neutrality by applying the same policies for delivering services and raising revenue to all 
States (that is, by applying average policies to all).’ (CGC 2010:37). 3 
 
Equity is a criterion that usually applies to people, not governments.  If the ultimate goal of HFE is equal 
treatment of otherwise-equal individuals, reflection suggests that the equity argument for fiscal 
equalisation must depend primarily on the claim that jurisdictionally-immobile sections of populations 
may otherwise be unreasonably disadvantaged by the operation of the fiscal system.  
Moreover, it needs explaining why governments that pursue only partial equalisation of budget capacities 
of private persons, should attempt full equalisation of public budget capacities. All redistributions have 
efficiency consequences, some positive and some negative. In the absence of an overriding ethical 
principle that supports the goal of exact fiscal equality, democratic nations generally accept a trade-off 
between efficiency and equity, for constitutional and political reasons.   
Against this viewpoint, there is a large theoretical literature in public economics on fiscal equalisation— 
see Boadway 2004 for a survey; also Boadway and Tremblay 2010: the seminal pieces were by James 
Buchanan 1950, 1952—designed to show the social planner if and how fiscal equalisation can be used to 
achieve an efficient assignment of taxing powers and expenditure responsibilities; or to induce 
autonomous subordinate jurisdictions to choose the optimal tax rates and spending, so as to internalise 
fiscal externalities (Oates and Schwab 1988); or to share fiscal risks optimally. Fiscal equalisation is not 
always necessary for optimality and generally not sufficient
5; or the correct equalisation formula is too 
hard to derive.
6 In this literature, the consequences of inter-jurisdictional mobility have been investigated: 
sometimes it makes the job of the social planner easier, sometimes not (Wildasin 1991; Boadway and 
Tremblay 2010). Sometimes in this literature, public policies are chosen through highly stylised political 
mechanisms, like majority voting in single-issue referenda. However, largely the literature is not well 
integrated with Public Choice, the school of thought founded by Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, which 
eschews the assumption of benevolent dictators or benign social planners; or with the more recent field of 
mechanism design. Moreover, it is curious that it is mostly about how to avoid the inefficiencies caused 
by the very fact of federalism itself—as though federalism were merely an unfortunate historical accident: 
if the omniscient social planner existed, then federalism would indeed be a sub-optimal institution. 
We should not exaggerate the degree of inequality in fiscal capacities that the Australian states would 
exhibit if the GST grants were made on some basis other than full horizontal fiscal equality including, 
specifically, equal per capita.
7 For reasons briefly explained in section 2, and especially the low barriers 
                                                           
5 For example, Wildasin (1991) concluded that only if communities with weaker preferences for redistribution 
receive appropriately-larger subsidies, through the federal fiscal system, would decentralised and centralised 
decision-making mechanisms both choose the optimal level of redistribution.  Also, Boadway and Tremblay (2010: 
1026) noted that in models of federalism with costless migration, a fixed factor (land) and local public goods, 
‘regional governments choose their tax rates and public goods supplies optimally, under reasonable 
circumstances,’ without fiscal equalisation payments. However, most state spending is on publicly-provided private 
goods (Boadway 2004:217). 
6 ‘With costly migration, decentralized decision-making is not optimal unless very complicated transfer schemes 
are in place, which involve giving regions the right incentive for providing G [publicly-provided goods] as well as for 
redistribution. Such schemes have yet to be worked out except in special cases, even in an otherwise firstbest 
world of lump-sum transfers. Equalization on top of that is very complicated’ (Boadway 2004:228). 
7 For example, some commentators have pointed to the contrast between the levels of public provision in the 
poorest of American states, compared to the richest, as an indication of what would happen in Australia if HFE 
were abolished. Arithmetically, EPC grants would reduce the variance in fiscal capacity, using the Grants 
Commission standard of comparison, which is EPC itself. Note that GST grants fund about one-fifth of state and 
local spending. 4 
 
to interstate migration, the differences in average living standards are relatively small across the 
Australian states and territories, and chiefly explained by demography; and so are the differences in fiscal 
capacity, the Northern Territory excepted.  Arithmetically, equal per capita grants would reduce the 
variance of fiscal capacities (compared with no grants). Table 1 illustrates the gain or loss, as a percentage 
of state expenditures (of 2009-10), that a shift to equal per capita grants (EPC) would cause. For the 
eastern seaboard, there is not much in it, but the Northern Territory and Tasmania gain greatly from the 
CGC processes. Only for the Territory would it be reasonable to worry that replacement of HFE by equal 
per capita grants could lead to the shocking sub-national disparities in public provision that can be 
observed in other countries.  
Table 1:    Approximate effects on state budgets of EPC grants compared with CGC 
recommendations,    2010-11 (% of general government expenses) 
NSW  Vic  Qld  WA  SA  Tas  ACT  NT 
1.05  1.38  1.71  6.45  -5.83  -12.67  -2.53  -53.00 
Sources: CGC 2011 and ABS 5512, 5506 
Note: The estimates are the percentage differences between the 2010-11 grants proposed CGC and equal 
per capita, compared with the 2009-10 general government expenditures. The GST collection for 2009-
10 was $46,553m; the estimate for 2010-11 is $45,950m. 
The paper first examines how the Grants Commission pursues fiscal equality, focussing on demographic 
variables, wages and mining (section 2).  For demography and mining, the Commission undoubtedly 
causes a movement toward fiscal equality. On wages, however, it is questionable that the Commission 
improves fiscal equality: mobility tends to make working households indifferent between jurisdictions, 
even if wage rates differ; thus, the Commission can mistakenly recommend the transfer of moneys from 
equals to equals; and disturb an efficient pattern of interstate migration and settlement. Other negative 
efficiency consequences of HFE are noted, as counterweights to the common claim that HFE improves 
economic efficiency. As was stated already, HFE in Australia strives for full equalisation of state budget 
capacities; in contrast, governments attempt only partial equalisation of private budget capacities. In 
section 3, I present a framework for considering the trade-off between equality and efficiency, adapted 
from Brennan and Pincus (2004 and 2010). The main result is that no allowance should be made for 
interstate differences in unit costs of public provision of (public or private) goods and services. An 
alternative distribution of GST monies is estimated for 2010-11. 
 
2: Equity and efficiency in HFE 
Equity and mobility 
The equity case for HFE depends on there being a significant degree of interstate immobility of some 
components of the population, whereas the efficiency case for HFE depends in part on there being a 
significant degree of interstate mobility of other sub-populations. A main argument of the paper is that 
interstate mobility of working households throws serious doubt on how the CGC accounts for differences 5 
 
in fiscal capacity arising from differences in the payroll and land tax bases.
8 Unintentionally, a significant 
part of the CGC‘s redistributions may be from almost-equals to almost-equals. This will have adverse 
consequences for efficiency as well as for equity. 
If otherwise-similar people are not treated similarly in the various states and territories, and if those 
differences are sufficiently great, then people will consider moving to another jurisdiction. In Australia, 
there are extraordinarily-low barriers to the interstate movement of people, capital, businesses, and goods 
and services. There is an extensive national social welfare system, and a highly-centralized tax system. 
Political, economic, social, legal and cultural differences are small, across the Australian states.  The 
Australian constitution has provisions designed to encourage the creation of a single national economy 
(one currency, one system of weights and measures, national regulation of banking, and so on); and there 
have been no internal tariffs for over a century. Gradually, non-tariff barriers to interstate trade have been 
removed or reduced by the High Court and by inter-governmental agreement; Australia has become more 
of a single national economy than a set of separated and disparate state economies. In particular, mutual 
recognition relating to the sale of goods and the practice of occupations came into force within Australia 
in 1992.
9  The Australian population is not only one of the most geographically-concentrated in the world 
but also one of the most mobile. The extent of interstate movement of families has been used to justify the 
national curriculum for schools. About 17 percent of the population move in any one year, and over 40 
percent in every five years (Hugo Panel report, p. 47). In 2008-09, 360 000 people moved interstate (ABS 
3412.0), which is about 1.6 per cent of the population; and net overseas migration was over 320 000. 
There are no legal restrictions on interstate migration; the cash costs of moving have fallen over time; 
cheap travel and communications assist in the maintenance of links back to the former location; laws, 
regulations and school curricula have become more uniform across the nation, so the degree of disruption, 
attendant on moving, has fallen.  
Therefore, no great differences can persist in the ways in which otherwise-similar people are treated in the 
various states and territories, unless they are immobile between jurisdictions. The across-jurisdictional 
dispersion of average personal disposable income in Australia is relatively small. 
However, even without fiscal equalisation there would be a substantial degree of inter-state redistribution, 
from the richer states to the poorer, mostly through the progressive income tax system, and through the 
Commonwealth government‘s provision of nationally-uniform social services and social security 
payments, both probably redistributing disproportionately towards locationally-immobile sub-
populations.  
Even if the claim were true that immobile sub-populations would be unfairly disadvantaged in some 
jurisdictions without HFE, we need to explain how and why HFE grants will change their situations. 
There is are two mismatches between this kind of equity argument and the methods of HFE: the 
distribution of the HFE grants is not determined solely by considerations of the size and nature of 
locationally-immobile elements of populations; and there is no guarantee that the grants will benefit those 
                                                           
8 This sub-section gives some theoretical support for the argument made by Peter Abelson (2010).  
9 The relatively-minor remaining impediments are being attacked by the High Court and by COAG, the Council of 
Australian Governments. COAG has explicit set itself the goal of boosting geographic mobility, to achieve a 
‘seamless national economy’ (COAG Communiqué, March 2008, p.2), with the first focus on national licensing 
system for certain occupations. 6 
 
elements of population (and, in the case of remote Indigenous peoples, good evidence to the contrary). 
Also, if sub-populations are badly served because their immobility lessens their political weight, then how 
will equalising grants alter that situation? Specific purpose grants may do the job, but not general-revenue 
grants.  
Therefore, I conclude that the equity argument for HFE has limited validity. I now turn to consider how 
the Grants Commission assesses the fiscal capacity of the states. 
 
Equivalised populations 
Some of what the CGC does on the expenditure side can usefully be regarded as calculating the per capita 
costs of servicing equivalised or standardised populations. This is the jurisdictional analogy of 
equivalised family budgets. Those states with a higher proportion of the aged and the infirm, for example, 
on that account would have a higher expenditure burden if they are to provide the Australian-average 
levels of services; and so on for other demographic categories. In Appendix Table A1, these adjustments 
are labelled ‗Demographic features,‘ and redistribute about one-third of the net redistribution of the CGC 
processes (that is, $1,155m compared with $3,598m).
10  
Fiscal redistribution on the basis of demography (and socio-economic status) at first sight seems fully 
consistent with the goal of equalising budget capacities
11.  However, the equity case for fiscal 
redistribution on account of socio-demographic characteristics of the populations is a short-run one, 
except as it relates to jurisdictionally-immobile populations. If a state with a low fiscal capacity offered 
low levels of public provision, then those thus most disadvantaged would have strong wish to move to a 
state with higher levels; and those with low costs of moving, will do so. (In the US terminology, the 
attractor states are often called ‗welfare honey-pots‘—but the argument is not confined to the provision of 
welfare.) Such inter-jurisdictional migrations may well have efficiency consequences, but for mobile 
populations they greatly weaken the case for HFE on account of socio-demographic differences, when the 
argument is based solely on claims about horizontal equity. 
Moreover, these are general revenue grants—there is no requirement placed on a state to spend the grants 
according to how they have been assessed.  So, in particular, Rolf Gerritsen has claimed that the Northern 
Territory has directed a significant portion of the GST monies that it receives on account of Indigeneity 
and remoteness, in such a fashion that the main beneficiaries have been non-Indigenous people in 
Darwin.
12 A strong case can be made for the Commonwealth to supervise the spending of this money, or 
to take direct responsibility for it. 
                                                           
10 By the Grants Commission’s method, the redistribution number $1,154m is half of the (row) sum of the absolute 
value of the column totals of the elements of Demographic features in Appendix Table A1. 
11 This is not to endorse the ways in which the CGC calculates EPC grants for equivalised populations, as I have not 
yet examined them in sufficient detail. 
12 Gerritsen is quoted by Erwin Chlanda in ‘Nice try by government’, Alice Springs News, July 31, 2008. Available at 
http://www.alicespringsnews.com.au/1526.html 7 
 
Table 2 shows my calculation of grants based on equal per equivalised head (that is, EPC adjusted for 
Demographic factors only), in comparison with the CGC recommendations and with EPC, using the CGC 
estimates of the distribution of costs on account of socio-demographic factors.
13  
 
Table 2         Grants per capita under different regimes: demography only    
   
NSW  Vic  Qld  WA  SA  Tas  ACT  NT 
1  CGC ($)  1986  1961  1905  1425  2681  3378  2404  10568 
2  EPEC ($)  1887  1604  2388  2514  2168  2440  760  10116 
3  EPC ($)  2083  2083  2083  2083  2083  2083  2083  2083 
4  %diff:2,1  -5.0  -18.2  25.3  76.4  -19.1  -27.8  -68.4  -4.3 
5  % diff:2,3  -9.4  -23.0  14.6  20.7  4.1  17.1  -63.5  385.7 
Source: Author‘s calculation using CGC 2011, Table 7 and passim. 
Notes: 
Line 1: Commonwealth Grants Commission‘s recommendations per capita for 2010-11 
Line 2: Equal per capita of equivalised populations (EPC adjusted for ‗Demographic features‘) 
Line 3: Equal per capita  
Line 4: Percentage difference between EPEC and CGC 
Line 5: Percentage difference between EPEC and EPC 
 
The effects of discounting completely all Grants Commission assessments except demographic would be 
substantial or huge for all but NSW and NT (line 4). On the other hand, the effects of moving from EPC 
(equal per capita) to EPEC (equal per equivalised capita) are shown in line 5: not large for Queensland, 
Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania, but huge for the ACT and the Northern Territory.
14  
Efficiency consequences of socio-demographic assessments 
Although the adjustment of the grants for differences in demographic composition is designed to and 
must increase fiscal equality, it can also have efficiency consequences. The usual argument is that such 
adjustments improve efficiency in so far as they deter inefficient settlement patterns across jurisdictions. 
For example: the South Australia population has a relatively-high proportion of the elderly; if SA 
government services to the elderly were to be financed solely from SA government‘s own-source 
revenues, then either SA would have relatively-high taxes and charges, or would offer relatively low 
levels of services to the elderly or some other sub-populations (cet. par.). The first response would tend to 
                                                           
13 Table 1 accepts all the factors that the CGC lists under ‘Demographic features’, including the factor called ‘Effects 
of where people live’, which takes into account differences in unit costs due, amongst other things, service delivery 
scale. In section 3 below, I argue against compensating for such differences in unit costs; but there was no easy 
way to separate these costs. 
14 Peter Abelson has pointed to the anomaly of the ACT’s having the highest household disposable income, by far, 
but gaining grants because of a low assessed revenue capacity. 8 
 
drive taxpayers out of the state, even if their productivity in SA were greater than elsewhere. The second 
response would tend to encourage settlement in other states of those who are soon to retire, even if their 
needs could be provided more cheaply in SA than elsewhere. 
However, the positive case is not water-tight. Most Premiers like to boast about growth of their state‘s 
population; sectional interests benefit from population growth and lend effective political support.  State 
government have, in the past, wooed retirees to settle in their states, on the reasonable assumption that, 
once attracted interstate, they are unlikely to move interstate again. A part of the attraction can be 
promises of superior levels of service. HFE gives a small encouragement to this kind of competition (a 
‗race to the top‘?), in so far as the all-state-average cost of state provision of services for the additional 
retirees in any one state is spread across all states. However, the state does bear a large portion of the cost 
of additional (above-standard) offering.
15  
Moreover, to the extent that retirees are attracted from locations in which their needs are cheaper to serve, 
the CGC compensates the destination states for their higher costs of service.
16 Later in the paper I make 
the case for the CGC to use an index of taxable capacity of the jurisdiction that takes account of state 
differences in rents and transit costs. In that context, here I note that, those retirees whose income is 
largely tied to the nationally-uniform age pension can gain by moving from high-rent to low-rent places. 
If those are also places of low (or high) productivity of services for retirees, then these migrations may 
worsen (or improve) economic efficiency. HFE on account of socio-demographic composition probably 
exacerbates these efficiency consequences. 
Spatial equilibrium 
An anecdote: when we both lived in Canberra, a friend told me that he had just been offered a job as 
Professor in Sydney. ―How  can I afford to take it?‖ he asked: ―Hou sing is so expensive in Sydney, 
compared with Canberra. I will go only if they offer me enough money to cover the difference in costs of 
housing.‖  They did raise the salary offer, and he did take the job in Sydney.  
Spatial equilibrium implies that a spatially-mobile worker would enjoy similar real incomes in every 
major capital city; and the counterpart for employers‘ incomes. Otherwise, there would be an incentive to 
move to gain a higher standard of living or profit.  Interstate mobility of workers tends to equalise the 
welfare of otherwise-similar people in otherwise-similar jobs, regardless of the state of residence. The 
equilibrating variables include productivity, wages, amenities and land values; that is, money wages and 
cost of living are both involved in bringing about spatial equilibrium.  For example, if a fork-lift driver 
can obtain a sufficiently-higher real wage in Brisbane than in Adelaide, then he or she may move 
interstate. This flow of interstate migration tends to drive up real wages in SA and drive them down in 
Queensland. Economies of scale would reinforce the movement; however, before everyone leaves SA, 
rises in land values, congestion and the like, produce a spatial equilibrium in which some fork-lift drivers 
                                                           
15 The simplest case is that in which the Commission merely takes a weighted average of the expenditures. Then a 
state with higher levels of service bears a fraction equal (1 – p) of the extra cost involved, where p is the state’s 
share of the national population. 
16 Cheaper, that is, for reasons recognised by the CGC under the headings of Economic activity – effects on 
expenses; Diseconomies of small scale; and Geographic and related influences. There are also other rent-
determined differences in costs of living; e.g., nationally-advertised branded goods tend to be higher priced in 
stores in high-rent districts: contrary to Ricardo, in the present of alternative uses (like in accommodation), store 
rents are a cost of production. 9 
 
reside and work in Adelaide and some in Brisbane, all enjoying about the same level of real wages. Any 
jurisdictional wage differences (at the level of the individual) are explained by the costs of moving and re-
settling.
17 
To explore the HFE consequences of the idea of spatial equilibrium, I will use the classical model of 
urban economics, the circular city.
 18  It is a world of private goods, in which everyone lives in one city-
state or another. For convenience, Figure 1 shows the cross-section of half of the circular city. All market 
exchanges take place at a point called the CBD. All production (except of transport) takes place in the 
CBD, and all journeys, for work and shopping, are to and from the CBD.  The horizontal axis shows the 
distance from the CBD: for simplicity, I assume that the density of settlement is the same at all locations. 
The rising dotted line shows the cost of transport or travel to the CBD, at all distances from the CBD. I 
have assumed that transit cost is linear in distance—but it could be any shape, and the argument goes 
through.  
Figure 1 conveniently shows the (Ricardian) rents by location. The down-sloping dashed rental curve is 
the mirror image of the dotted transit gradient: the differential transport costs associated with each locality 
give rise to the differential of land prices of each locality. Land located near the CDB incurs a very small 
travel cost, and therefore commands a large locational rent. Land at the perimeter of the city, at point R, 
incurs a large travel cost but the land there commands a zero Ricardian locational rent.  The land-value 
gradient reflects the land-transport gradient: same slope, opposite sign. (Land values beyond R are not 
city values, but rural values, which I take as zero for convenience of exposition.) For simplicity, I assume 
everyone travels in his or her own private vehicle. 
In this simple case, the sum of land rent and transport charge is a constant across the city: looking only at 
locational costs, a person should be indifferent between situating at the CDB, or at the perimeter R, or 
anywhere in between: everywhere along OR, the sum of land rent plus travel cost to the CBD is a 
constant.  
 
                                                           
17 This assumes that labour markets are relatively competitive: restrictions on new entrants—of the kind that 
Mutual Recognition is designed to remove—could support differences in real wages across locations. In a report 
commissioned by the CGC, Borland and Lye (1995, p. 11) state that ‘To establish the ‘state-specific’ component of 
labour costs the theoretical analysis suggests that two types of corrections to earnings data are required.  First, it is 
necessary to adjust earnings data for differences in skill levels and job characteristics of employees.  After adjusting 
for these effects, residual differences in earnings between employees will be due to location-specific factors 
relating to employment conditions.  Second, it may be necessary to adjust earnings data for the influence of non-
competitive factors such as trade unions or imperfect competition in product markets.’ Having adjusted for skill 
levels and job characteristics, Borland and Lye use state dummies to capture state-specific fixed effects on wages.  
These effects could include state-level differences in the cost of living, or differences in the marginal product of 
labour (not captured in the other controls for worker skills).  An extension of this approach would be to include 
extra explanatory variables intended to directly represent state-level cost of living differences – such as rents and 
the cost of journey to work: see Appendix table A2.  
18 The Figure echoes the economic model used by Dixon, Picton and Rimmer (2002). However, I do not use their 
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When all residents have equal real incomes 
This simple model can illustrate that, if all residents had the same level of real income, the Grants 
Commission would upset the equality through HFE. (Later I will consider difference in incomes.) 
Assume the city in Figure 1 comprised two States of Australia—the inner two-thirds comprise State 
Inner-Large—and the outer third, State Outer-Small. By assumption, each person has the same economic 
status, so any aggregation of persons has the same average economic status as any other aggregation. 
Thus, State Outer-Small and State-Inner Large have the same taxable capacity, per head, if we consider 
residents only in their capacities as workers. To ensure that land ownership does not disturb this equality, 
assume that all residences are rented; that all land-owners are fully mortgaged; that all mortgages are 
owned by a corporation; and that every worker has an equal share of ownership of that corporation.
19  
(Also, assume equal shares in all other wealth, which is not subject to state taxation.) 
With this set up, the CGC would recommend an HFE transfer from State Inner-Large to State Outer-
Small, ceteris paribus. Yet, by assumption, everyone has the same level of real income and wealth.  
In this simple model, the taxable capacity of any person is limited to their wages minus the costs of 
earning, which are rent and transit costs. Mortgage income is not taxed by the States, but payrolls are, as 
is city land not containing the principal residence of the owner. State Inner-Large would be credited by 
the CGC with a higher tax base than State Outer-Small, because of the higher value of land; and credited 
with the same per capita payroll tax base. Yet, by assumption, prior to HFE the two states have the same 
fiscal capacity on the revenue side.  
What tax rates would each state levy? Without HFE, a natural assumption would be that they would raise 
the same total tax per capita. This would occur if they imposed identical land tax and payroll tax systems; 
but any tax mix that raised equal amounts per capita would do. However, once HFE is taken into account, 
then the residents of Inner-Large would be treated more harshly: that is, HFE would offend against the 
principle of horizontal fiscal equity. Moreover, in view of the belief of the CGC that its processes do not 
significantly alter state policies, it is worth noting that the CGC redistributions in this case would 
themselves tend to induce differences in state taxation practices. However, for HFE to have efficiency 
consequences, we need incorporate scope for mobility—which the next model does. 
Two City-States 
Now consider two circular city-states of different sizes: City-State S, which is the small; and City-State L, 
which has n-times the radius (and 4n
2 times the area and population). For convenience, I again assume 
that the rental gradient the same at all locations, and the same in the two cities. Geometry tells us that 
each location in City-State L has a sum of {rent + transit} that is n-times that of City-State S: the average 
land value is n-times higher, and the average transport outlay is n-times higher. 
                                                           
19 Using the methods of the Grants Commission, when all residents are owner-occupiers (to deal with the other 
extreme), both States would be credited with zero land tax bases for residences, and equal per capita payroll tax 
bases. Thus, a change in land ownership within a state does not change aggregate annual income and, therefore, 
does not alter the aggregate tax base of a state. There would be no fiscal equalisation that is due to differences in 
tax bases.  (Note that the Income Tax Act does not recognise travel to the principal workplace as a cost of earning; 
states do not levy land taxes on owner-occupied housing.) 12 
 
For mobile residents to be indifferent between living in State S and in State L, the money wages in State 
L would have to be high enough to compensate for the higher cost of living in City L. The theoretical 
point is that if both cities exist, and if people can move from one to the other, then similar people will 
enjoy similar levels of real income in the two cities. This means that, for the workers, higher wages in 
City L are offset by higher costs of living in City L.
20 And, for wages as cost, the higher wages would be 
matched by higher productivity, if employers sold into spatially-integrated, competitive markets. 
Differences in taxable capacity 
The CGC approach is to evaluate each tax base separately, and to aggregate the estimated differences in 
taxable capacity. Instead, the Productivity Commission (2008) advocated using a single index of the 
(sustainable) revenue capacity of a jurisdiction, namely, the sum of the disposable incomes in the 
jurisdiction, net of federal taxes. Peter Abelson (2010) has argued that the single index should take 
account of the differential costs of location—essentially, rents and transit costs. The model of spatial 
equilibrium presented here reinforces Abelson‘s position. 
The wage income per head of population varies across states because of differences in employment ratios; 
differences in the mean of the distributions of wage incomes (the ‗wage level‘ effect); and differences in 
the shape of the distributions of wages incomes (the ‗composition effect‘). To simplify the exposition, I 
will initially assume away the composition effect; and assume that differences in wage levels are offset by 
differences in costs of living. 
To adopt the assumption most favourable to the Commission‘s methods, assume that the owners of land 
that is subject to land taxes all reside in the state in which the land is located. Then the taxable capacity of 
a state with a larger city—in the example above— exceeds that of the other by the difference in land 
values per head. However, the Commission‘s approach assumes that, in addition, higher wage incomes 
add separately to the taxable capacity. It involves a form of partial double-counting: to the extent that the 
higher wages are compensation for higher rents, then only one or the other indicates higher taxable 
capacity. If the distribution of earning capacities (composition of employment) were the same in the two 
states, other than in their means, in the simple example used earlier State L would have a larger tax base 
by the differences in rental values, per head. 
More generally, in the absence of a composition effect, the alternative, single index of taxable capacity of 
state K would include  k(Wk - rk - Jk) + Rk, where   k is the state‘s employment rate; Wk, rk, and Jk are the 
state‘s averages for wages, and worker‘s rental and transit costs ; and Rk is the average taxable rent, all in 
per capita terms. (I have ignored out-of-state ownership of land.) The complete index of taxable capacity 
requires the addition of all other income sources; and the subtraction of Commonwealth imposts. 
(Although the other income sources are not discussed in this paper, similar arguments about equalising 
differences may apply to them.) 
The CGC uses differences in total payrolls (per head) as one of its bases for fiscal redistribution. Of 
course, even if there were no locationally-driven differences in the levels of wage rates, average payrolls 
would differ across locations according the composition effect (that is, distribution of jobs, industries and 
                                                           
20 There is evidence to support the proposition that, over a range of city sizes, productivity is higher in larger 
cities—they enjoy economies of conglomeration or aggregation; but that there are offsetting effects of congestion 
and other disamenities that work to limit the sizes of cities: see Glaeser and Gottlieb 2009. 13 
 
human capital); in particular, one State may have a higher percentage of highly-paid workers with high 
human capital—a possibility discussed in the next paragraph. But over and above that factor, the CGC 
assumes that, for any given type of wage worker, a higher wage fully represents a higher capacity for tax 
purposes. But, if the theory of spatial equilibrium has empirical heft, then this is wrong. By imposing a 
higher burden on the residents of the state with higher nominal wages but not higher real wages for 
similar people and jobs, the Commission‘s approach to fiscal equalisation offends the principle of 
horizontal fiscal equity, and distorts the pattern of settlement—workers are induced to migrate to the 
smaller state.
21 
Now introduce a composition effect. Assume that the high wage state also has a higher fraction of highly-
paid workers than the other state. If state-provided goods and services are superior goods, then the state 
with the higher average income would be expected, in the absence of HFE, to have higher rates of taxes 
and charges. This would encourage Tiebout-style sorting: lower-wage workers would be attracted to 
reside in lower-wage states for fiscal reasons, not reasons of productivity. HFE would exacerbate these 
Tiebout effects, rather than lessening them, because the high-wage state would be forced to subsidise the 
fiscal capacity of the low-wage state.
 22 (This is not a general result, but depends on the assumption that 
the state with higher nominal wages levels also has a wage distribution more skewed to the right; and on 
state provision being a superior good.) 
Estimating the efficiency consequences would require modelling the budgetary responses of the states, 
and of the mobile population, to the (endogenous) error in the GST redistribution. This has not been 
attempted, but there is no reason to expect that it would be trivial. 
Wage equations  
Generalising, the world being modelled is one in which there is a finite number of observably-different 
types of people, in terms of their human capital. In spatial equilibrium, each type of person would be 
indifferent as to location (modulo the costs of re-location). 
Let Wik be wage available to any such person by locating in State K = 1, 2; rik be the (individual‘s) 
locational-rental component of housing costs; and Jik be transit costs (all measured in units 
commensurable with Wi). Denote the individual‘s cost of transfer (to any other state) as C, and the 
residual (or unexplained) state wage premium as d1,2, then spatial equilibrium requires that  
(Wi1 - ri1 - Ji1) -  (Wi2 - ri2 - Ji2) = C + d1,2, at the level of the individual, i.
23 Thus, the appropriate 
dependent variable for the wage equations would be Wik - rik - Jik. If, however, information on housing 
costs and transit costs were available only as jurisdiction-wide averages, denoted rk and Jk, then the 
appropriate equation would explain Wik by the usual regressors, together with rk, Jk, urban amenities and 
state dummies. In both equations, the coefficient of a state dummy would provide an estimate of the 
unexplained interstate wage premium (including the cost of moving interstate). 
                                                           
21 Intuitively, the final equilibrium, at which HFE-induced migration ceases, would leave the city-states of unequal 
size, but not at their efficient relative sizes. 
22 It is ‘...impractical to take migration costs into account in designing equalization systems, even in relatively 
simple settings’ (Boadway 2010:225). 
23 This is over-simplified, in that the moving cost, variable cj, should only apply to the state that is, on balance, 
attracting immigrants of type i. 14 
 
For its estimates of interstate wage differences, the Grants Commission has relied on regressions 
explaining individual earnings or wage rates in the private sector, with the usual regressors, like age, 
experience, education, occupation, industry, country of birth; and with dummies for the states and 
territories; but not including regressors like land values or housing costs and commuting times or costs. 
The American evidence is that their inclusion causes a large downward adjustment in the estimated 
difference in real wages in different-sized cities; a similar reduction may be expected for the coefficients 
on the state dummies.
24 
Reverting to the previous discussion of a single index of taxable capacity, the expression Wk - rk - Jk is the 
weighted average real wage of jurisdiction k. The wage premium would then be measured as the 
difference from the real wage of the ‗reference states‘ used for the state dummies in the wage regression. 
Wages as cost 
Every ground for redistribution used by the Commonwealth Grants Commission should be examined in 
isolation, before considering their combined effects. Here I will consider the Grants Commission‘s 
adjustment for differences in wages-as-cost. My conclusion is that either the Commission is in error on 
equality; or that it is causing economic inefficiency.
25 
The CGC explicitly assumes that higher private sector wage rates mean higher public sector wage rates 
(CGC 2010:64-65) and I will assume the same.
26 Because NSW, for example, has relatively high private 
sector wage costs, the Commission awards NSW a higher GST grant than otherwise (cet. par.), to 
compensate NSW for its (imputed) higher public sector labour costs.  Under the CGC‘s methodology, in 
order for NSW to provide the all-state average per capita level of publicly-supplied goods and services, 
NSW needs to spend more per capita; and so the CGC awards NSW more GST monies, cet. par.  
The validity of this line of reasoning depends on the unobserved relationship between wages and labour 
productivity in the public sector.  Presumably, NSW private sector wages are higher because private 
labour has higher productivity in NSW.
27 What then is the relationship between public sector wages and 
public sector productivity in NSW? There are two polar possibilities. If NSW public sector wages do in 
fact reflect higher productivity in the public sector—Case A—then the CGC is using a mistaken ground 
to justify the transfer of some money to NSW on account of higher wages (cet. par.); the transfer creates 
                                                           
24 Yanknow (2006) reported that, when differences in costs of living were taken into account, there were 
substantial falls in the estimates of the ‘big city’ wage premium in the United States, the largest being from 14 to 4 
percent. 
25 I understand that various states have made submissions to the Grants Commission, using arguments along the 
lines set out in this sub-section. 
26 The Grants Commission takes account of wages as a public sector cost; and as the base for the payroll tax. From 
the Commission’s Table 7-3 (reproduced below), they about offset each other on average, but NSW on balance 
gains non-trivially from having high wages. The CGC adjusts the calculated wage differences for Tasmania and the 
ACT, and then discounts by the one-eighth. In their extensive study of inter-sectoral and interstate wages, Borland 
and Lye (1995: 68-9)) found no ‘overwhelming evidence of significant differences in earnings of public sector and 
private sector employees in each state...Second, state of residence effects are generally not a significant 
determinant of earnings.’ 
27 This requires that the output markets are closely integrated across jurisdictions, which implies that unit labour 
costs in the industry are the same in different jurisdictions. 15 
 
fiscal inequality. However, if higher public sector wages do not in fact reflect higher public sector 
productivity—Case B—then the transfer of monies to NSW is needed to equalise fiscal capacity.
28 
This, nonetheless, is not the end of the economic story of Case B. Supporters of HFE generally believe 
that, as well as improving equity (in the sense of horizontal fiscal equity between individuals in different 
jurisdictions), HFE also improves economic efficiency. Case B is a counter-example: transferring monies 
on account of difference in wage levels could damage economic efficiency. In Case B, higher public 
sector wages are not matched by productivity.
29 Therefore, a sum of GST monies would buy more public 
services in a low-wage state, say SA, than in a high-wage state, say NSW, so the transfer on GST monies 
from SA to NSW reduces the level of national output (in proportion to the differences in unit labour 
costs).  
The appendix formalises the two considerations: the tax side (payroll and land) and the wage-expense 
side. In order to judge the outcomes, we need a normative framework within which to balance equity 
against efficiency.  
 
Mining assessments 
Redistribution of mining revenues is the largest factor moving grants from EPC. Undoubtedly, it serves to 
reduce fiscal inequality. Table 3, line 2, shows that WA would receive less than half EPC, if the only 
factor adjusting EPC were mining revenue assessments; Queensland and the Northern Territory would 
lose over one-fifth of grants made under EPC. (It should also be recalled that mining profits are taxed 
currently by the Commonwealth at the rate of 30 per cent; and will yield a large share, possibly one-
quarter, of all company tax revenues over the next few years, or about five percent of Commonwealth tax 
revenues. And the government intends to introduce the Minerals Resource Rent Tax.) 
The Australian Constitution assigns ownership of sub-soil mineral deposits to the state or territory in 
which they are located. However, the high degree of vertical fiscal imbalance means that the 
Commonwealth Parliament is in the position to make conditional grants to the states that they dare not 
refuse; and Parliament has seen fit to make grants on the basis of HFE.  
   
                                                           
28 In Case B, the full difference in wages may not accurately reflect differences in unit labour costs: if the state 
dummy in the wages equations is significant when state-specific costs of living are included as regressors, then the 
coefficient of the state dummy measures the state-specific difference in productivity (which in competitive 
circumstances would be captured as rents on industrial and commercial land.) 
29 Presumably, variations in the gap between public sector wages and labour productivity in the public sector may 
be due to the imperfect integration of public sector labour markets, across jurisdictions. 16 
 
Table 3         Grants per capita under different regimes: mining only 
        NSW  Vic  Qld  WA  SA  Tas  ACT  NT 
1  CGC ($)  1986  1961  1905  1425  2681  3378  2404  10568 
2  Mining ($)  2265  2413  1818  999  2313  2332  2430  1787 
3  EPC ($)  2083  2083  2083  2083  2083  2083  2083  2083 
4  %diff:2,1  14.0  23.1  -4.6  -29.9  -13.7  -31.0  1.0  -83.1 
5  % diff:2,3  8.7  15.8  -12.7  -52.0  11.0  12.0  16.6  -14.2 
Notes 
Line 1: Commonwealth Grants Commission‘s recommendations per capita for 2010-11 
Line 2: Equal per capita adjusted for Mining revenues only 
Line 3: Equal per capita  
Line 4: Percentage difference between CGC and EPC 
Line 5: Percentage difference between EPC and EPC adjusted for Mining revenues only 
Source: Author‘s calculation using CGC 2011. 
What is the argument for ‗taxing‘ WA for having mines in horrible places and not ‗taxing‘ NSW for being 
blessed with a beautiful setting for its capital city; or Tasmania, for its pristine wilderness? In the absence 
of HFE, WA would have superior public services, and people would trade those off against the terrible 
heat.  Presumably, the argument for treating mineral resources differently, from other natural capital, is 
that the benefits of Sydney harbour (say) already manifest in fiscal capacity as measured by the 
Commission. On the revenue side, this could be in land values; or in wages, as a result of the industry 
mix: Sydney is a more attractive place to live and work than is, say, a remote Western Australian mining 
province; and so Sydney supports a competitive manufacturing industry that eludes WA. It is argued 
elsewhere in this paper that the CGC assessments do not (and by implication, cannot) equalise fiscal 
capacity with any reasonable degree of accuracy.  A pertinent example: to the extent that the NSW 
climate and setting makes it easier to attract labour, NSW wages do not need to be as high—but the CGC 
does not discount wages for differences in costs of living (as argued earlier). So it is not clear that 
difference in natural endowments other than mining are accurately reflected in the CGC assessments.  
Moreover, there is something strange about equalising mining revenues, in view of exhaustibility. To 
maintain a target level of consumption, a state needs to invest a higher share of its mining revenue than, 
say, its tourism revenues. The CGC assesses mineral taxing capacity as the gross value of minerals 
produced in each State (plus an adjustment for revenue received under revenue sharing arrangements with 
the Commonwealth).
30  In effect, the Grants Commission‘s recommendations redistribute ownership of 
                                                           
30 This is one case in which the CGC assessment methodology is far from being ‘policy neutral’: mining production 
is so unevenly distributed across the states that, say, a decision by WA to raise its royalty rates will have a 
significant effect on the Australian-average rate (and, after a lag of a couple of years, to the additional royalty 
revenue being redistributed according to each state’s share of the Australian population). Similarly, the ‘average’ 
tax rate used by the Commission is very sensitive to WA’s tax rates (in a slightly mysterious ways: see David Uren, 
‘State’s “own goal” over royalties’, The Australian newspaper, May 21-22, 2011). 17 
 
sub-soil mining rights, but only in so far as ownership manifests as taxable mining output. Royalties, the 
main mining revenues for the states and territories, can be regarded as a deferred, contingent payment for 
the right to mine: the state owns an asset—the deposit—and transfers rights over that asset in return for a 
stream of payments. This transaction has no net effect on the state government‘s balance sheet; nor would 
an ex ante auction for the right to mine (even if the state agreed for the auction price to be paid over a 
period of years).  The CGC methodology has recently moved a little way towards a balance sheet 
approach.
31 An HFE treatment of mining that would be more in keeping with a balance sheet approach 
would be for the CGC to assess the size of the ‗permanent income‘ stream that is provided by a state‘s 
natural capital.
32  
Efficiency considerations of mining assessments  
On the positive side, the argument is that if, say, the WA government kept all of its mining revenues, then 
it could lower other taxes (say, the payroll tax) or increase state spending per head. Either reaction could 
distort settlement decisions: a worker with a higher productivity in another state may be attracted to WA 
by the superior fiscal bargain offered there.
33  
On the negative side, HFE reduces the payoff to the Treasuries of the mining-rich states and therefore has 
some disincentive effects. Inevitably there are political costs as well as political benefits in approving 
exploration and mining, and the associated activities of construction, earth moving, water use, storage, 
transport, movements of workers, and so on.  WA, for example, has about 10 percent of the Australian 
population, and so it retains about 10 percent of any public revenues from additional mining, after a lag of 
couple of years.  At the margin, when a state government does not retain all of the tax revenues generated 
by its decisions, let alone only one-tenth, it would be less likely to grant the necessary approvals speedily 
and without restrictive conditions.  
More subtly, HFE encourages those state governments to gather some of the mining rents in ways other 
than royalties (or cash payments generally). In particular, HFE encourages states to impose costly ‗works 
programs‘ on miners, in excess of what the miner requires for its activities. These additional costs would 
tend to decrease the level of mining activity and, therefore, decrease royalty payments; similarly, if works 
programs are negotiated as an alternative to an increase in royalty rates on existing mines. However, it is 
rational for the state government to prefer works programs over cash, so long as the works meet a benefit-
cost ratio of about ten percent (in the WA case): the works program need only be one-tenth as valuable (to 
the state government) for it to be preferred over a cash receipt of equal cost to the miner.
34   
                                                           
31 More strictly, the CGC’s approach is implemented by calculating the net lending a State would need for its end 
of year net financial worth per capita to be equal to the average, if it started the year with the same net financial 
worth per capita as other States (CGC 2010:60).  
32 The United Nations Development Program has a methodology for estimating ‘natural capital’. The CGC has 
reduced the delay before equalisation, so as to make more timely recommendations. 
33 Interestingly, there have been complaints that Australian residents will not move to WA mining regions in 
sufficient numbers, despite the offer of fabulous wages and salaries; and the Premier has suggested that the 
Australian government pay the unemployed $10,000 to accept a job in WA. (Josh Jerga, ‘Workplace Relations 
Minister Evan says open to talk incentives for worker migrations’, The Australian newspaper, April 28, 2011) 
34 In South Australia some years ago, Santos donated monies for a new School of Petroleum Engineering at 
Adelaide University, when the state was considering extending some rights to Santos. 18 
 
 
3: Balancing equity against efficiency 
The classic basis of the argument in favour of HFE was formulated by James Buchanan and colleagues 
(1950, 1952; see also Buchanan and Wagner 1971 and Buchanan and Goetz 1972)
 35. Buchanan discussed 
when average incomes differ across jurisdictions. However, he did not take account of the possibility that, 
if one jurisdiction is able to provide some goods and services at a lower cost, that itself may be a reason to 
support the unequal fiscal treatment of equals within a federation.  
 
To analyse this possibility, Brennan and Pincus (2004, 2010) devised a simple model that allows for inter-
jurisdictional differences in efficiency in producing whatever the public sector provides. Reasoning 
behind the veil of ignorance shows that, when real public-sector costs differ across jurisdictions, full 
fiscal equalisation is not justified except under extraordinary ethical assumptions. In effect, full HFE 
ignores differences in jurisdictions‘ comparative advantages. The main lesson from this model is that 
HFE should severely discount, even ignore, differences in the unit costs of provision.  
 
Consider a simple federation, with two jurisdictions or states, called L and S, for Large and Small. For 
convenience, assume that the many people in the population are identical. Under the veil of ignorance, the 
members of the constitutional convention know is that they or their children will live in one jurisdiction 
or the other. The initial jurisdictional allocation of people is random, except that more people are 
allocated to state L than to state S. Once they have resided in state L or state S, they and their children 
will stay there.  
   
                                                           
35 Martin Feldstein (1971) argued that Buchanan and Wagner mistook pecuniary externalities for real externalities; 
and that, if labour is mobile but land not, fiscal equalisation of the kind proposed by Buchanan and Wagner would 
induce an inefficient pattern of settlement. However, pecuniary externalities can induce real behaviour; and the 
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The ordinates of Figure 2 are utilities attained by a (representative) person, depending on whether he or 
she is located in state L and state S. (The person is assumed to have the same utility function, regardless 
of location.) Figure 2 illustrates a Social Welfare Function that embodies the idea of the veil of ignorance. 
Utility is treated equally, regardless of jurisdiction of residence, so the iso-SW curves are symmetrical 
about the 45  line from the origin; and the slope of the tangents along that ray is 45 : one is shown. In 
addition, the iso-SW curves are convex to the origin, illustrating a trade-off between equality and 
efficiency, with increasing marginal rates of substitution as we move further from the 45 .
36 The 
curve concave to the origin is a utilities-possibility-frontier.
37  
At the optimum, point F, the person gets a different level of utility, depending on to which jurisdiction 
they are randomly assigned. Unless nature and human ingenuity deliver a UPF that is locally symmetrical 
at US = UL, then it would be decided in the constitutional convention to permit some degree of 
locationally-determined inequality. HFE would reduce social welfare. This is a general result, 
independent of the reasons for the shape of the Utilities Possibility Frontier.
38 
There is a singular case in which the SWF is Cobb-Douglas and the identical individual utility functions 
are also log-linear (see Brennan and Pincus 2010 for details). Then the optimum requires equal per capita 
expenditures in each location: budgets are equalised, but not fiscal capacities. In particular, differences in 
the cost of public (or private) supply of private goods provide no grounds for public or private 
redistribution.
39  
In general, however, partial but not full equalisation is justified, so long as there is a social welfare trade-
off between equality and efficiency; and so long as there are differences in the costs of public provision.
40 
                                                           
36 If the iso-SWF curves were straight lines, then there would be no trade-off between equality and efficiency: the 
only thing that matters would be efficiency. With symmetry, those straight SW lines will have a negative 45 degree 
slope. This would illustrate classical Utilitarianism, in which SW is the sum of individual utilities. At the other 
extreme, if the iso-SW curve were two straight lines meeting at right angles along the 45 , then there would be 
no trade-off between equality and efficiency: equality would then be the single objective of the constitutional 
convention, the only desideratum. 
37 The argument of Figure 2 assumed ex post immobility. In personal communication, Robert Schwarz pointed out 
that, with mobility, HFE may improve the efficiency of locational or settlement choices; therefore, only points 
inside the UPF can be attained without HFE (or some perfect substitute). Thus, HFE improves Social Welfare if the 
induced movement towards the frontier is large enough, measured along the 45 . 
38 Boadway (2004:218) concluded that, with additively-separable utility, ‘If labor is mobile between regions, 
unconstrained social welfare maximization will generally call for different levels of net utility for potential migrants 
if public goods are not purely private... That is because of the economies of scale in consuming public goods which 
implies that utility per capita depends upon population in a complicated way.’ 
39 To avoid confusion, and to put the results in context, I emphasise that the argument in Figure 2 relates to ex 
ante equals. A different kind of argument is needed to justify the extent of budget redistribution between ex ante 
unequals. ‘[F]ar from fiscal equalization involving weaker value judgements than "the distribution of fiscal burdens 
and benefits among unequals," as Buchanan suggests, fiscal equalization requires stronger value judgements. In 
other words, in order for fiscal equalization to be justified, the social welfare function formulation must embody a 
stronger commitment to equalization than is required for the equalization of private goods consumption. It must 
indeed embody a commitment to complete equalization of the kind characteristic of maximin.’ (Brennan and 
Pincus 2010: 257.) 
40 Because of distortions in the real world, the optimum may not be reached. 21 
 
The argument applies whether the public sector is supplying local public goods, or private goods (or 
something in between); and is not confined to federations: if in a unitary state, a regional town is less 
efficient than a city in providing whatever it is that the state provides, then the city should get more in 
quantity; and vice versa. Cash welfare payments made by the national governments in both federal and 
unitary countries do not normally vary according to local cost levels; why should equal consumption be 
mandated for public benefits in-kind?
41  
There is an additional efficiency effect. As a matter of HFE principle, the CGC would equalise for any 
(intrinsic) factor that tends to lead to different unit costs of provision—if the data were good enough and 
the factor material. The CGC equalizes for cost disadvantages due to diseconomies of small scale; and for 
geographic and related influences on unit cost. (The extra cost of serving remote or very remote areas 
may as high as one-half.) The CGC has equalised for the sinuosity of roads, and for the extra costs that 
tropical states incur in building and maintenance, including when a state has decided to allow settlement 
in cyclone-prone areas. When a State does allow settlement in areas that are more costly to service than 
are other areas of the state, then HFE means that the extra costs are spread to other states; and this must 
influence decisions about patterns of settlement within states, with consequences for economic efficiency. 
 
4: Public choice 
As is noted earlier, there is an extensive literature on the effects of fiscal equalisation on the efficiency of 
the allocation between governments of tax bases, spending responsibilities, risk. In large part, this 
literature adopts an idealised view of government decision-making.  
If, instead, one adopts a Public Choice viewpoint, then one may conclude that, to encourage political 
accountability and responsibility, the best system of grants is none at all. This would require huge 
changes in the Australian fiscal system, and is not considered further. A more pragmatic recommendation 
would be a system of equal per capita grants, which would internalise the fiscal effects of marginal 
spending and taxing decisions of the states: they would be forced to finance their additional spending; and 
could cut taxes and charges or reduce deficits if they cut back on spending.  In addition, EPC grants 
would be simple to understand and transparent.  Arguments about clarity and responsibility in the 
political system are some distance from the usual discourse of economists about economic efficiency of 
fiscal equalisation. Nonetheless, they deserve serious consideration.
42 
Equal per capita grants would be easy to arrange for the distribution of GST monies. But GST grants 
represent about half of Commonwealth grants to the states. For clarity and responsibility, it would be 
better if all non-GST grants were treated in the same way: either by ‗inclusion‘ or by ‗exclusion‘: that is, 
thrown into the GST pool for redistribution by the CGC, or not. Again, from the point of view of political 
transparency, treating all by exclusion would be preferable: then the Commonwealth would be seen to 
deliberately discrimination among the states on various grounds, for which it could be held politically 
responsible.  It would also obviate the need to make a distinction (one that Commission understands but 
does not seem to take seriously) between marginal and infra-marginal grants. 
                                                           
41 The argument has relevance for ‘postage stamp’ pricing of public utilities. 
42 This discussion draws on Pincus (2010). 22 
 
Of the non-GST grants, about half are treated by the Commission as fungible—in the old Commission 
language, by ‗inclusion‘. Although in some instance the Commonwealth instructs the Commission on this 
matter, the Commission has considerable discretion as to how to treat non-GST grants. A recent instance: 
would the grants made by the Commonwealth to Queensland for flood relief be equalised across all the 
states, or not? It seems almost ridiculous that that decision should be made by a statutory authority.  
Again: in the recent federal election, Ms Gillard promised to fund 80 per cent of the $2.6b cost of the 
Parramatta-Epping railway line. This rail line did not appear in the list of proposals that New South Wales 
previously put forward for consideration by Infrastructure Australia. Yet suddenly funding is promised. 
Presumably, New South Wales‘ government would have preferred capital funds to go elsewhere. But the 
prospect of winning a western Sydney seat proved attractive for Ms Gillard. For the Commonwealth 
government to offer funding for some specific project, there must be some net positive payoff to the 
Commonwealth government. The Commonwealth has to do the taxing, so it wants some political 
advantage from the spending. The obverse is that the state is relieved of having to collect sufficient tax 
revenue or to borrow, but it has to share the political kudos, and to re-order its spending priorities. 
However, this $2.1b grant may add only $0.6b to the funds of New South Wales, less than one-third of 
what Ms Gillard promised—a pea and thimble trick. Unless the Commonwealth pre-empted the CGC 
decision on the matter, the Grants Commission is likely to treat the $2.1b grant ‗by inclusion‘: in effect, 
putting the $21.b in with the pool of GST funds to be distributed across the States and Territories.
43  
An EPC system for the GST, plus other grants by exclusion, would reduce some of the adverse incentive 
effects of the current system. These are many and various, and some have already been mentioned. Two 
worth noting here relate to the incentive for states to engage in reforms of the kind that the 
Commonwealth formerly rewarded under National Competition Policy, and now rewards through the 
COAG Reform Council. 
School vouchers:  Say that, in an effort to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of education, a State 
moved to a voucher system for all schools, government and non-government; and simultaneously 
legislated to permit the creation of publicly-funded ‗charter schools‘. This kind of arrangement has been 
successfully implemented in a number of countries, including Sweden.  Say that the reforms seemed to 
improve school efficiency and effectiveness. However, say they caused a flow of students out of 
government and into non-government schools. Under the Grants Commission‘s methods for calculating 
for the cost of ‗standard‘ levels of publicly-provided services, this State would receive a lower percentage 
of the pool of GST funds, as a consequence of the decline in enrolments in government schools. The state 
would be penalised for increasing school choice; as would parents, if the reduction in GST grants was 
passed on in the form of a reduced voucher. 
Gambling limits: Currently, the Commission treats the capacity to raise gambling revenue as equal per 
capita (CGC 2010, vol. 2:142). It is therefore to be expected that states would tend to rely more on 
gambling taxes than previously: their revenues are not shared with other states. Meanwhile, through the 
efforts of some of the independents in the federal parliament, efforts are being made to put limits on the 
losses that ‗problem gamblers‘ may suffer. 
                                                           
43 I should remark that the CGC has the discretion to change its methods if convinced that the existing ones are 
unfair; but, if they are true to their word, not if their methods lead to inefficiencies. 23 
 
State tax reform: The Victorian government (2011) has made the (plausible) claim that the processes of 
the Grants Commission punishes or, at least, does not reward states that engage in the very tax reforms 
that the Commonwealth is encouraging. In particular, a state that reduces or abolishes inefficient or 
nuisance taxes will still be credited by the CGC with a particular taxable capacity (depending on the tax 
involved).
44 Moreover, if the abolition is only in one state or a few, then the Commission does not change 
the standard tax rate that it applies to a reforming state‘s tax base. In addition, if the Commonwealth 
rewards the state for this action, and if the reward is treated by inclusion, then other states share in the 
reward payment. 
  
5: What is to be done? 
A fiscal system without grants would make the states fully responsible for their own spending and, from 
the point of view of political accountability, is most desirable. It would likely require states to impose 
income taxes; and for the Commonwealth to retain GST revenues and to foreswear making grants to the 
states (or, at least, general revenue grants: Pincus 2010).   
The next best alternative would be a system of equal per capita grants, EPC, funded by the GST.  If there 
were no other grants, then the states would be fiscally responsible on the margin.  Table 1 suggests that 
EPC grants could be applied without great damage the budgets of all but the Northern Territory. This 
exception reflects the great influence of assessments for Indigeneity makes to the Commission‘s 
calculations. If Indigeneity was dealt with outside of the Grants Commission processes, then EPC grants 
to all jurisdictions could be supplemented (as formerly) by special grants to the claimant states—SA and 
Tasmania—and the two territories.  To encourage fiscal responsibility, the supplementary grants should 
be scheduled progressively to vanish by the end of ten years for the states, and twenty for the territories.  
If EPC proves politically impossible, an alternative is to adapt the Grants Commission‘s calculations to 
achieve partial, not full HFE, as in Table 4, which presents an alternative distribution with following 
characteristics (referring to factors listed in App. Table A1)
45: 
1.  On the expenses side, it accepts the Grants Commission‘s assessment for Indigeneity and Non-
state service provision; all other socio-demographic factors are discounted by half. 
2.  On the revenue-raising side, it discounts all CGC adjustments by half.
46 
3.  Differences in unit costs of provision (Interstate wage levels, Diseconomies of small scale) are 
discounted completely (that is, given zero weight). 
4.  All non-GST grants are treated by exclusion (that is, discounted completely). 
 
Despite these large adjustments to the Grants Commission‘s assessments, line 9 shows that the resultant 
shocks to budgets are not huge. Table 4 includes all of the Grants Commission adjustments on account of 
                                                           
44 Alternatives would be for the Commonwealth to instruct the Commission to remove that tax base from 
equalising treatment; or to treat the reforming state’s tax base as equal to the average, so that it neither gains nor 
loses grants on account of that tax base; or as zero. 
45 These proposals also apply to a system of EPC grants to all but three or four smaller jurisdictions. 
46 Mining should be dealt with using a balance sheet approach, as discussed, but this has not been attempted. 24 
 
Indigeneity. However, there is a strong argument for removing Indigeneity from the HFE process, thus 
reducing the pool to be distributed by whatever method is used, including EPC grants.
47   
Table 4        Grants per capita under different regimes             
  
 
NSW  Vic  Qld  WA  SA  Tas  ACT  NT 
1 Alternative ($)  1926  1814  2191  1880  2371  2796  1612  10508 
2 EPC ($)  2083  2083  2083  2083  2083  2083  2083  2083 
3 CGC ($)  1986  1961  1905  1425  2681  3378  2404  10568 




           
  
5 %diff: 1,2  -7.6  -12.9  5.2  -9.8  13.8  34.2  -22.6  404.4 
6 %diff: 1,3  -3.0  -7.5  15.0  31.9  -11.6  -17.2  -33.0  -0.6 
7 %diff: 1,4  2.1  13.1  -8.2  -25.2  9.3  14.6  112.0  3.9 
8 %diff to budget: 1,2  -1.7  -3.0  1.0  -2.0  2.8  7.0  -3.7  52.6 
9 %diff to budget: 1,3  -0.7  -1.6  2.7  4.5  -3.0  -5.7  -6.2  -0.4 
Source: Author‘s calculation using CGC 2011; and ABS 5512, 5506. 
Notes 
Line 1: Adjustments as in note 38 above 
Line 2: Equal per capita  
Line 3: Commonwealth Grants Commission‘s recommendations per capita for 2010-11 
Line 4: Equal per equivalised capita (as in Table 2) 
Line 5: Percentage difference between Alternative and equal per capita 
Line 6: Percentage difference between Alternative and Grants Commission‘s recommendations 
Line 7: Percentage difference between Alternative and equal per equivalised capita 
Line 8: Percentage differences between equal per capita and Alternative, compared with the 2009-10 
general government expenditures 
Line 9: Percentage differences between Alternative and the 2010-11 grants proposed Grants Commission, 
compared with the 2009-10 general government expenditures 
 
   
                                                           
47 It is straightforward to estimate a grants distribution along the lines of Table 4, but with Indigeneity removed 
from the GST pool and the assessment. However, the resultant distribution needs to be compared with budget 
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Appendix 
Table A1 Causes of differences in fiscal capacity, 2011-12 GST 
       
 
NSW  Vic  Qld  WA  SA  Tas  ACT  NT  Redist 
Effects of:  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m 
Revenue raising capacity 
                    Mining production  1325.4  1845.4  -1212.6  -2520.4  379  127  125.1  -68.9  3801.9 
  Payrolls paid  -439.9  -98.9  446.8  -340.3  271.5  126.7  -2.2  36.2  881.3 
  Property sales  179.7  125.8  -477.7  -278.7  322.1  116.9  -10.3  22.1  766.7 
  Land values  -39.2  64.8  -95.5  -252.7  187.7  77.5  37.3  20.1  387.4 
  Motor taxes  327.2  -44.2  -84.8  -224.9  8.2  -6.7  17.2  7.9  360.6 
  Other effects on revenue  -132.6  29.8  46.1  19.6  7.1  17.9  4.9  7.2  132.6 
Expense requirements 
                    Indigeneity  -550.9  -1696  526.9  521  -231  16.1  -87.3  1501  2564.7 
  Population dispersion  -548.8  -805.4  378.8  653.3  160.4  -88.8  -199  449.6  1642.1 
  Interstate wage levels  500  500  -461.8  508.8  -128  -97.2  89.2  89.3  1187.3 
  Socio-economic status  381.2  10.4  -272.9  -525.4  537.8  201.9  -233  -99.8  1131.2 
  Non-State service 
provision 
-767.1  -279.3  223.7  564.7  -67.6  34.8  26.4  264.4  1114 
  Population growth  -583.4  46.1  521.3  383.8  -257  -107  -19.4  15.2  966.4 
  Diseconomies of scale  -393.1  -243.7  -152  48.1  99.4  197.5  205.9  238  788.9 
  Other effects on 
expenses 
-127.3  -237.9  238.9  -30.6  -70.3  159.6  61.4  6.1  466.1 
Commonwealth 
payments 
208.3  615.3  -345.4  5.7  -229  -103  78.3  -230.5  907.5 
Total  -664.4  -1172  -718.1  -1464.1  990.2  673.9  94.1  2261  4018.9 
Source: CGC 2011, Table 7 28 
 
This rest of this appendix provides a formal definition of assessments of payroll taxes, land taxes, and 
public wage costs; compares the methodology of the Commonwealth Grants Commission with the true 
assessments; and shows the connection with state wage premiums. It applies to the restricted case in 
which the distributions of wage incomes in the two states differ only as to mean. 
Abelson (2010) has provided numerical estimates of the error in tax assessments, along the lines 
discussed here. 
Table A2 compares the assessments of fiscal capacity using the Grants Commission methodology, 
compared with using the theoretically-correct methodology. There are two states: k = 1, 2; labour is only 
variable public sector input; land is owned by residents of one state or the other (no ‘foreign’ land-
owners).  The ‘standardised CGC budget’ per capita is  P{ 1W1 -  2W2} +  L{R1 - R2} - (W1 – W2)E + gi = 0. 
The first two terms are the assessed advantage in revenue capacity of state k, of payroll and land taxes; 
where  t is average tax rate across states, t = P (for payroll) and L (for land);  k is participation rate 
(workers/population); Wk are the average wage; Rk is rental value per capita for land tax purposes (and 
commensurate with W; so  L is the land tax rate expressed as a rate on the rental value, not land value). 
The third term is the assessed expenditure disadvantage of state k, with E being Standardised quantum 
of service per cap. The last term, gk, is the variation from equal per capita grants, chosen to ensure 
balance. (I have ignored any discounting of factors that the CGC may have adopted.) Other notations in 
the table are: rk is land rental cost to workers; Jk is transit cost for workers in state k (both 
commensurate with W); αk is fraction of land taxable in state k that is owned by residents of state k;  k is 
the unit labour input in production of E in state k, or the inverse of labour productivity. 
Table A2: Comparing assessment methodologies 
  Payroll tax assessment  Land tax assessment   Expense assessment 
CGC methodology    P{ 1W1 -  2W2}  L{R1 - R2}  (W1 – W2)E 
True  P{ 1(W1 - r1 - J1) –  
         2(W2 - r1 - J1)} 
L{(α1R1 +(1 - α2) R2) – 
       (α2R2 +(1 - α1) R1)} 
( 1W1 –  2W2)E 
Difference  P{ 1(r1 + J1) –  
         2(r1 + J1)} 
2 L{ (1 - α1)R1 – (1 - α2)R2}  {(1 -  1)W1 – (1 - 2)W2}E 
 
In the special case illustrated in Figure 1, the error in tax assessment is equal to 2{ P +  L(1 - α)}(R1 – 
R2), on the assumption of no difference in real wages; and with Jk = rk, where   is the ratio of 
householders’ land rental costs to the rental value of taxable land (and so rk =  kRk); and  where, in 
addition, the parameters  ,   and   are the same in both states. 
The wage premium of state 1 over state 2, not explained by differences in costs of living and interstate 
migration, is s1 = (W1 –  r1 – J2) – (W2 – r2 – J1) – C   0, where C is per worker cost of moving from state 2 
to state 1 (commensurate with W). 
 